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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3208 
_____________ 
 
ARONDA LIZA SMITH,  
 
         Appellant  
 
v. 
 
ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General, United States; JANET NAPOLITANO, Secretary of 
Department of Homeland Security; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Director of U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services; EVANGELIA KLAPAKIS, Field Office Director 
of Philadelphia U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Field Office 
 
                                           
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-05321) 
District Judge:  Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 19, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: VANASKIE, BARRY and CUDAHY,* 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion Filed: July 11, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
                                                 
*  Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.   
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CUDAHY, 
 
Circuit Judge 
This is a case about a legally invalid marriage in the context of a visa petition 
proceeding. This case also poses the question whether a court may affirm agency 
decisions on bases different than those articulated by the agency.   
Aronda Smith is a citizen of the United States. She claims to be married to James 
Tuah, a citizen of Ghana. Tuah first traveled to the United States on a nonimmigrant visa 
for a four week visit in 1999. On his visa application, he stated he was married to Mary 
Akua Asante, a citizen of Ghana, and that they had two children. Tuah reentered the 
United States in 2004 but illegally stayed after the expiration of his visa. He purportedly 
married Smith in 2006.  
In 2008, Smith filed an I-130 petition to grant Tuah immigration benefits as her 
husband. Tuah concurrently filed an application to change his status from visitor to 
lawful permanent resident based on his marriage to Smith. Following standard procedure, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interviewed Smith and Tuah, and 
issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Smith’s petition because of inconsistent answers to 
questions about their marriage. In response, Smith submitted additional evidence of a 
genuine marriage, but after reviewing Tuah’s immigration record, USCIS sent a second 
Notice of Intent to Deny. This second notice stated that Tuah had previously married 
Asante and requested proof that the two had officially divorced.  
As evidence of his divorce, Tuah provided an affidavit from his uncle, Andrew 
Ampah. The affidavit, however, did not address any divorce, but rather stated Tuah and 
 3 
Asante had never formally entered into marriage in the first place. Finding this 
unpersuasive, USCIS noted that Tuah had not provided evidence of divorce for his 
previously self-acknowledged marriage and concluded that his marriage to Smith was 
invalid. For this specific reason, USCIS denied Smith’s petition. Smith, therefore, could 
not confer any immigration benefit on Tuah.  
Following the USCIS finding of an invalid marriage, Smith appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the original decision without opinion. She 
then appealed to the district court, contending that the USCIS denial was arbitrary and 
capricious. The district court, which had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 
U.S.C. § 704, granted summary judgment against Smith, finding that USCIS reasonably 
relied on the facts that Tuah presented in his own visa application. The district court also 
noted that the conflicting answers given by Tuah and Smith, as well as the dearth of 
evidence of a three-year marriage supported “a finding of a sham marriage.” The district 
court found USCIS used all of the above evidence in making its decision, and the 
outcome was not arbitrary or capricious. Smith appealed. This court has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  This court reviews a motion for summary judgment de novo. 
Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d Cir. 2005). We will affirm. 
I. 
A court may set aside an agency’s decision if that decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 
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706(2)(A)). In making that determination, the court should not re-weigh the evidence 
presented but must determine only if “a reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as 
adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 
(1938). Thus, if an agency revokes a visa petition on the basis of a rational explanation, it 
does not abuse its discretion. Ghaly v. INS, 48 F.3d 1426, 1430–31 (7th Cir. 1995). In this 
case, USCIS could have reasonably concluded that Smith had not met her burden of 
establishing a legally valid marriage.  
The evidence reasonably persuaded USCIS that Smith and Tuah’s marriage was 
invalid. Based on Tuah’s own admissions, USCIS found that he was previously married 
to Asante. On his first nonimmigrant visa application Tuah stated that he was married to 
Asante, gave the date of their marriage and indicated that they had two children. He also 
represented that he and his wife would provide financial support for the trip.  
Additionally, Tuah did not provide a record of divorce from Asante. Instead, Tuah 
provided an affidavit from his uncle stating that unbeknownst to Tuah at the time he filed 
his first visa application, Tuah was never actually married to Asante. USCIS found that 
the uncle’s statement was not persuasive evidence of Tuah’s eligibility to enter into 
marriage with Smith.  Weighing Tuah’s previous admission against his uncle’s affidavit, 
USCIS concluded Tuah was previously married and never divorced. This determination 
was not an abuse of discretion.  
Smith argues that Matter of Kodwo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 479 (BIA 2008) favors a different 
result, essentially contending that USCIS should have accepted the affidavit of Tuah’s 
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uncle over Tuah’s statements concerning his own marriage. This argument is unsound. In 
Kodwo, the BIA held that affidavits from the heads of household may be sufficient to 
establish the dissolution of a customary tribal marriage under Ghanian law. Id. at 482–83. 
But the affidavit here does not describe the dissolution of a marriage; instead, it asserts 
that Tuah and Asante were never married. Moreover, though Kodwo allows certain 
affidavits to serve as evidence of a customary tribal marriage, it does not guarantee a 
favorable ruling based on such affidavits. See id. at 481–83 (noting that affidavits 
regarding customary law are not favored and must include specific information to 
suffice). 
II. 
 
The district court justified the reasonableness of USCIS’s decision with the rationales 
USCIS provided in both the first and second Notice of Intent to Deny. The rationale 
behind the second notice, as explained above, was Tuah’s previous and still valid 
marriage to Asante. The first notice questioned whether Smith and Tuah entered into the 
marriage for U.S. immigration purposes, and the district court relied on substantial 
evidence in the record to find that USCIS’s denial was not arbitrary and capricious 
because the “evidence amply support[ed] a finding of a sham marriage.” The district 
court’s willingness to note that Smith’s marriage was likely fraudulent is understandable. 
During their interview with USCIS, Smith and Tuah gave inconsistent answers to 
questions about when Tuah usually showered, the length of time they had lived at their 
current address and whether their bedroom had an alarm clock. Tuah and Smith were also 
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only able to provide very little documentation of their three-year marriage, and Smith’s 
pay stubs and tax forms from 2008 list her as single. Moreover, the joint checking 
account and health policy that Smith offered as evidence were both created within two 
months of the scheduled USCIS interview. In sum, it appeared that Smith and Tuah had 
not entered into a bona fide marriage, and USCIS made its view to that effect clear in its 
first Notice of Intent to Deny.  
However understandable it was to draw this conclusion, we note that the district court 
should not have reached the issue of fraudulent marriage. A court reviewing federal 
agency action under the APA is limited to the explanations of the agency in the 
administrative record. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50. In this case, USCIS’s 
decision was premised solely on Tuah’s failure to show that he had divorced Asante. 
While USCIS’s first Notice of Intent to Deny provided evidence that Tuah and Smith had 
not entered into a bona fide marriage, the issue of fraudulent marriage is absent from 
USCIS’s Notice of Denial, which is the only appealable action taken by USCIS. Since 
USCIS never passed on the question of fraudulent marriage, the district court exceeded 
its authority in determining that marriage fraud was an additional reason for denial.  
Despite the district court’s improper finding on the marriage fraud issue, it did not err 
in granting summary judgment. There was a reasonable basis for the initial USCIS 
decision, and under APA review that is all that is necessary to uphold such a 
determination.  Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment against 
Smith. We AFFIRM.  
